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ABSTRACT. The responsibilities of the manager have
been examined through several lenses in the business
ethics literature: Kantian (Bowie, 1999), contractarian
(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999), consequentialist (Fried-
man, 1970), and virtue ethics (Solomon,1992), to name
just four. This paper explores what the ethical responsi-
bilities of the manager would look like if viewed through
an evolutionary lens. Discussion is focused on the impact
of evolutionary thinking on the process of moral rea-
soning, rather than on the sources or the substance of
morality. The conclusion is reached that the evolutionary
lens supports the view that moral luck plays an important
role in how we assign ethical responsibilities.
KEY WORDS: business ethics, theoretical foundation,
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The impact of Darwin’s theory of evolution has
been felt across all disciplines. Dennett (1995) likens
evolutionary theory to a ‘‘universal acid’’ that con-
tinuously corrodes the pillars of our hitherto held
beliefs and values – ‘‘it eats through just about every
traditional concept, and leaves in its wake a revo-
lutionized world-view, with most of the landmarks
still recognizable, but transformed in fundamental
ways’’ (p. 63). In philosophy, it has raised important
questions, such as – Where do our morals come
from (Wilson, 1998)? Can our morals be as com-
pelling under an evolutionary perspective as they
would be under alternative world-views (Dennett,
1995; Rorty, 1995)? This paper explores a more
micro-level phenomenon: the impact of the evolu-
tionary forces that are present in organizational life
on our notions of individual moral responsibility.
Evolutionary theory is, of course, no newcomer to
research about the management of organizations.
Several rich literatures draw on evolutionary theory
in an effort to better understand organizational and
management processes, including work in organiza-
tional theory (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Hannan and
Freeman, 1977), evolutionary economics (Hodgson,
2002; Nelson and Winter, 1982) and strategic man-
agement (Burgelman, 1983; Teece and Pisano,
1994). Yet, much of the work in these literatures has
little to say about how fundamental evolutionary
processes might also be used to enlighten our view of
individual moral responsibility as it pertains to work
in organizations. In particular, evolutionary theory –
which provides a broad framework for understanding
the incessant and often unpredictable evolution of
socio-economic systems – draws our attention to the
fact that individual managers go about their daily
business amid systems that are largely beyond their
control (Hayek, 1960). Such a view is consistent with
the notion that something important is missing from
much of modern moral theory – the role of moral
luck in our conceptions of individual responsibility
(Michaelson, 2008; Nagel, 1979; Williams, 1979).
For it is the basic argument of moral luck theorists
that we do treat individuals as objects of moral
judgment even when a significant aspect of what they
do depends on factors beyond their control – which
indicates that moral luck leaks into our evaluations.
In what follows, we draw on a variety of established
evolutionary thinking in order to show how an evo-
lutionary view of organizational management leads to
a stronger appreciation of the arguments of moral luck
theorists regarding the responsibilities of the manager.
On the one hand, this builds an incrementalist element
on to evolutionary thinking in organizational man-
agement; on the other hand, it shows how the concept
of moral luck in business is stronger when placed on a
firm theoretical foundation. We proceed as follows.
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The section ‘‘Evolutionary thinking in economics and
management’’ briefly reviews the use of evolutionary
models in management, and some of their distinctive
features vis-a`-vis similar models in the natural sciences.
The section ‘‘The usefulness of evolutionary thinking
for business ethics’’ discusses why an evolutionary
perspective could provide useful insights into the
study of business ethics. The section ‘‘Inertial forces at
the individual, organizational, and institutional levels’’
explores inertial forces at the individual, organiza-
tional, and institutional levels, respectively. The
section ‘‘Multi-level and multi-stage selection’’
analyzes the impact on the manager of selection pro-
cesses operating simultaneously at different levels. The
section ‘‘An evolutionary grounding for moral luck:
implications for evaluating individual responsibility’’
discusses implications of the evolutionary perspective
for our concept of individual responsibility by high-
lighting how an evolutionary viewpoint supports
arguments by moral luck theorists. The section
‘‘Conclusion’’ offers some concluding thoughts.
Evolutionary thinking in economics
and management
In this section, we attempt to achieve two objec-
tives. First, we trace the use of evolutionary thinking
in economics and organizations research. In partic-
ular, we underscore the fact that our attempt to
apply the evolutionary lens to business ethics is sit-
uated within a long tradition of scholarship that has
used evolutionary thinking to illuminate economic
and organizational phenomena. Second, we outline
the distinctive features of evolutionary thinking as it
has been applied in the social sciences vis-a`-vis the
natural sciences.
Evolutionary thinking has a long history in the
social sciences, and particularly in economic thought
(Stoelhorst, 2008). Indeed, it has been argued that
Malthus (Maynard Smith, 1993; Schweber, 1977,
1980), Smith (Schweber, 1977, 1980) and the pre-
vailing economic structure in Britain (Maynard Smith,
1993), influenced Darwin’s thinking in important
ways. Maynard Smith (1993) explains that:
Darwin was consciously influenced by the ideas
expressed by Malthus in his Essay on Population. Mal-
thus was concerned to justify the existence of poverty
among a considerable section of the population; he
argued that the human population is capable of
increasing indefinitely in a geometric progression, and
must therefore be held in check by the limited quan-
tity of food available, and so by starvation. The argu-
ment is in part fallacious, since there is no evidence
that the main factor limiting the human population is
the shortage of food. However, the observation that
animal and plant species, including the human species,
are capable of indefinite increase in numbers in opti-
mal conditions, is correct, and plays an important part
in the theory of natural selection. Darwin must also
have been influenced by the fact that he lived in the
era of competitive capitalism, when some firms were
improving their techniques, and increasing in size and
affluence, while others were going bankrupt, and old
crafts were dying out. It is unlikely that the concepts of
competition and the struggle for existence in nature
would have occurred to him so readily had he lived in
a more static feudal society (p. 43).
Hodgson’s work (1993, 2002) provides a pene-
trating analysis of evolutionary principles and the
history of evolutionary thinking in economics, in
which he examines the works of Marx and Engels,
Spencer, Marshall, Menger, Veblen, Schumpeter,
and Hayek. He asserts that for several decades,
Spencer was as influential in biology as Darwin, and
was the first to use the term ‘‘evolution.’’ Further-
more, he argues that Marshall (1948) recognized the
superior efficacy of the biological over the mecha-
nistic metaphor in explaining economic phenomena,
as is evidenced by his statement – ‘‘the Mecca of the
economist lies in economic biology rather than in
economic dynamics’’ (p. xiv). In the theories of
some of the scholars discussed by Hodgson (e.g.
Spencer and Veblen), explicit use is made of the
biological analogy, while in those of others (e.g.
Schumpeter, and Hayek), elements of evolutionary
thinking can be clearly perceived.1
The social sciences were arguably slow to adopt
evolutionary models, partly because of their unfor-
tunate association with Social Darwinism and other
such theories which were used as apologies for
colonization, slavery etc. For example, in the dec-
ades following the Second World War, there was a
lull in the use of evolutionary models in economics,
coinciding with the rise and subsequent dominance
of mechanistic equilibrium models with heavy
emphasis on the use of mathematics. However, this
114 S. Ramakrishna Velamuri and Nicholas Dew
started to change in the 1970s with the publication
of Hannan and Freeman’s work on organizational
ecology (1977) and Nelson and Winter’s theory of
economic change (1982), which re-ignited interest
in the application of evolutionary models in orga-
nization studies and economics. Currently, scholars
in business schools researching innovation and
technology change, organizational theory, strategic
management, and entrepreneurship all draw exten-
sively on evolutionary models.
A question that is frequently raised when evolu-
tionary models are considered in the social sciences
is, How faithful must they be to the concepts and
theories in evolutionary biology? (Hodgson, 2002).
Hodgson (1993) remarks that:
With particular regard to the transposition of the
biological analogy, John Maynard Smith (1972,
pp. 36–43) and Michael Ruse (1986, pp. 32–35) dis-
tinguish between the heuristic and justificatory roles of
an analogy. An analogy-as-heuristic suggests ways of
approaching the study of a phenomenon without
implying the same kind of causal relationships. The
stronger idea of analogy-as-justification involves a
transfer of claims of truth from one domain to another.
However, the distinction between these two types of
analogy is not as clear in practice, as all theories involve
the dogmatic adoption of hard-core assumptions, and
even heuristic analogies will dispose the theorist to
make untested assumptions of one kind rather than
another (p. 19).
‘‘It is thus argued that a source of creativity in science
is through the juxtaposition of two different frames
of reference, so that already existing and previously
separate ideas can cross-fertilize’’ (p. 21).
According to Campbell (1969), evolutionary
theory comprises four generic processes: variation,
selection, retention and diffusion, and a struggle for
scarce resources. Aldrich (1999) claims that these
four generic processes are necessary and sufficient to
account for evolutionary change. ‘‘If processes
generating variation and retention are present in a
system, and that system is subject to selection pro-
cesses, evolution will occur’’ (Aldrich, 1999, p. 21).
Langton (1984) asserts that ‘‘evolutionary theory is a
concatenated system of loose, but apparently true
and heuristic propositions … it poses interesting
questions, provides clues to their solution and, per-
haps most crucially, generates testable hypotheses’’
(p. 352). Dawkins (1983), Dennett (1995), and
Hodgson (2002) have all argued that Darwin’s the-
ory is universal precisely because it specifies the
general mechanisms (an ‘‘algorithm’’, in Dennett’s
terms) that is neutral and can be applied to any
evolving system (Stoelhorst, 2003). Therefore,
‘‘[E]ven if the detailed mechanisms of change at the
social level are quite different from those described
in biology, socio-economic evolution is still Darwinian in
several fundamental senses’’ (Hodgson, 2002, p. 272;
italics original). The position taken by Nelson and
Winter (1982) in this respect is clearly one of not
being straitjacketed by the biological analogy:
We emphatically disavow any intention to pursue
biological analogies for their own sake, or even for the
sake of progress toward an abstract, higher-level evo-
lutionary theory that would incorporate a range of
existing theories. We are pleased to exploit any idea
from biology that seems helpful in the understanding
of economic problems, but we are equally prepared to
pass over anything that seems awkward, or to modify
accepted biological theories radically in the interest of
getting better economic theory (witness our espousal
of Lamarckianism) (p. 11).
In keeping with the analogy-as-heuristic approach,
economists and management scholars have not hesi-
tated to adopt concepts in their evolutionary models
that are eschewed by many evolutionary biologists.
Two such concepts are multi-level selection and
Lamarckianism. Multi-level selection (Aldrich and
Ruef, 2006; Durand, 2006; Henderson and Stern,
2004) refers to the view that there can be different
selection processes operating simultaneously at dif-
ferent levels – for example, at the individual, firm, and
institutional levels – each with different selection
criteria. This idea is developed at greater depth later in
this essay. Lamarckianism is the view that an entity
can acquire characteristics through learning and
pass on these learned characteristics.2 And while
biologists reject Lamarckianism, forms of learning that
Lamarckianism essentially encapsulates are generally
thought to be very important components of inno-
vative behavior in organizations (March, 1991).
We briefly note that the evolutionary theories
applied in the management field have been faced,
since their inception, with two problems: first,
defining the entity being selected (the economic
equivalent of a gene) and, second, defining an
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organizational generation. On the first problem,
Nelson and Winter (1982) – building on the work of
Cyert and March (1963) – proposed that routines be
considered as the entities being selected at the
organizational level. However, routines have proven
rather difficult to observe empirically and somewhat
less stable than theorized (Feldman and Pentland,
2003). Others have proposed teams (Hodgson and
Knudsen, 2004) and individuals (Stoelhorst, 2003) or
initiatives/project proposals (Burgelman, 1983) as
appropriate units of selection. Within the literature,
it now seems accepted that any bounded entity that
interacts, for example groups, organizations, popu-
lations, and communities, is an appropriate unit of
analysis (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006).
The second problem has proved more difficult to
resolve. Population ecologists have used organiza-
tional birth and death rates as proxies for a generation
(Barnett and Carroll, 1995). This raises the question
whether the history of long surviving firms, for
example the Ford Motor Company and General
Motors, can be thought of as having spanned just one
generation. Is Ford today not radically different from
what it was under Henry Ford? Population ecologists
respond that long-surviving firms are a very small
minority of all the organizations that are created, and
thus, at a population level, their existence does not
pose a problem of great magnitude. Hannan and
Freeman (1984) and Tushman and Romanelli (1985)
propose the alternative that simultaneous and dis-
continuous changes in the four core organizational
dimensions of mission, authority structure, technol-
ogy, and product market be considered as the tran-
sition from one generation to the next. In general
these difficulties – and the imprecise and provisional
nature of the solutions proposed – have not been an
obstacle for the field in building up an impressive
body of literature (Denrell and Kova´cs, 2008).
Of course, a pragmatic approach to academic in-
quiry would generally support the use of different
lenses for the study of complex phenomena. Ameri-
can pragmatists such as Rorty (1979) and Goodman
(1983) have argued in favor of adopting methods
from one science in the study of another. Based on
their arguments, we believe that the appropriate
question is not whether these lenses are scientifically
‘‘right’’, but instead, Does the use of the evolutionary
lens contribute new insights to the study of organi-
zations, and specifically, to business ethics?
To summarize, the application of evolutionary
thinking has a long history in the social sciences,
although it has been applied very differently to its
use in the natural sciences. We believe that we are
the first to explicitly apply the evolutionary lens to
business ethics.
The usefulness of evolutionary thinking
for business ethics
There is a significant literature dealing with the
implications of biological evolution for human
morality in general (see, for example, Dennett, 1995,
MacDonald, 2001, Rorty, 1995, Wilson, 1998). This
literature explores how our notions of morality would
change if we accepted that there are no transcen-
dentalist sources – either religious or secular – for our
morals. We eschew discussion of both the sources of
our morals and their substance, not so much because
these issues are unimportant but because they have
been amply addressed in other work. Instead, our
focus is on the responsibilities of the manager, viewed
through an evolutionary lens. Business ethics can be
thought of as having two broad goals, one directed at
modifying the norms and conventions under which
business is transacted, the other at modifying the
behavior of organizations through a modification in
the behavior of individuals. The first consists in
making economic agents (individuals, firms, and
institutions) aware that businesses have a huge impact
on how people live their lives, and that business
decisions are not, and cannot be, devoid of moral
content. The bio-ethicist MacDonald (2001) argues
that from an evolutionary perspective:
[M]oral standards are the products of biological and
cultural evolution. Biological evolution has given us
brains capable of certain cognitive tasks, and capable
of manifesting certain emotions. On top of this
bio-psychological substrate, cultural evolution has built
a wide range of particular norms and conventions. The
field of ethics can be interpreted as being devoted to
influencing the course that the evolution of these
norms and conventions takes (p. 99).
The second goal of business ethics consists in
providing frameworks that can help individuals
reason through their ethical dilemmas. Considering
both goals, the question that arises from an evolu-
tionary perspective is, How does our understanding
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of the process of ethical reasoning in business change
if viewed through an evolutionary lens? Relatedly,
what do the ethical responsibilities of the manager
look like under an evolutionary perspective?
There are several arguments that support the use
of evolutionary models in business ethics. The most
obvious is that evolution has radically altered the
pillars that sustain our most basic beliefs and values –
it is a ‘‘universal acid,’’ to use Dennett’s term (1995).
Therefore, it is useful to explore how our under-
standing of business ethics would change if viewed
from an evolutionary perspective, i.e. viewed from
the perspective proposed by Stoelhorst (2008) that
management be viewed as an evolutionary disci-
pline. Many individuals may find that the evolu-
tionary approach does not appeal to them, just as
some individuals do not find Kantian deontology, or
consequentialism, or virtue ethics, appealing. Yet
these competing frameworks co-exist and are all
taught in business ethics courses. The evolutionary
approach can be regarded as one additional con-
ceptual framework with which to analyze problems
in business ethics. Furthermore, to the extent that
business ethics as a discipline is concerned with
bringing about changes for the better in business
practices, these practices can be examined under the
four general evolutionary processes of variation,
selection, retention and diffusion, and competition
for scarce resources.
First, business ethics as a discipline is interested
that firms vary their practices along more ethical lines
(at least those firms that have non-ethical or
unethical decision-making cultures). Second, it is
interested in understanding what behaviors will
enhance the possibility that a firm will survive the
successive selection screens of a competitive envi-
ronment3; this may enable it to confront with better
evidence the dominant paradigm in business and
economics academia (not necessarily in business
practice) that relates superior performance exclu-
sively to enhancing shareholder value.
Third, it is interested in how ethical best practices
are retained in the organizations in which they are
first introduced, and how they are diffused to other
organizations until they become institutionalized in
the form of conventions.
Fourth, it is interested in how the struggle for
scarce resources – material, financial, and human –
has an impact on the first three processes.
Additionally, business ethics can benefit from the
longitudinal analysis that is the hallmark of the evo-
lutionary approach. According to Hodgson (2002,
p. 259), ‘‘Darwinism also involves a basic philo-
sophical commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal
explanations.’’ The key point to recognize here is
that ethical time is not reversible – that events that are
ethically salient leave tracks in individual memory
and collective history that cannot easily be erased,
thus giving business ethics a unique and complex
historical character.
It is not the claim of this paper that many of these
characteristics cannot be effectively analyzed through
alternative lenses; only that evolutionary theory is
well suited for this exercise.
Inertial forces at the individual,
organizational, and institutional levels
Evolutionary theory in economics has largely focused
on two levels of analysis: the organizational and the
institutional. At the level of organizations, Nelson and
Winter (1982) proposed that organizational routines
be considered the units of analysis, or the entity that is
selected. At the level of institutions, broadly defined
as ‘‘standardized patterns of behavior’’ (Nelson and
Sampat, 2001), the entity selected is custom or tra-
dition, or convention. At the level of the individual,
one can define values and habits as the equivalents of
organizational routines or institutional customs. The
important characteristic to note with values and
habits, routines, and customs and conventions, is that
they create inertia, i.e., a disposition to behave in a
certain way. Inertial forces make individuals, orga-
nizations, and institutions resistant to change. They
therefore bring longitudinal dispositions to bear on
the actions and decisions of individuals.
All individuals have values which make them see
situations as appropriate or inappropriate. These
values form an integral part of the decision making of
individuals in organizations, even though they may
not be explicitly invoked. For example, a pacifist
would not see any attraction in a handgun distribu-
torship, no matter how financially lucrative it is and
even where such an activity would be legal. Similarly,
many business families in India with a tradition of
strict vegetarianism do not enter businesses such as
leather, processed seafood, etc. A European manager
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who has been brought up to take the welfare state for
granted may hesitate when faced with the prospect of
dismissing an employee in the US without any notice
period or compensation. Thus, it is clear that we all
join organizations with our own baggage of values,
which constrains our ability to change our behaviors.
Similarly, habits too predispose us towards certain
actions. According to James (1890) – ‘‘Habit is the
enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious
conservative agent. It dooms us to fight out the battle
of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early
choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that dis-
agrees, because there is no other for which we are
fitted, and it is too late to begin again’’ (p. 63). For
Aristotle, habits play a central role in virtue – ‘‘Moral
education assumes that someone has the right sort of
nature, and it trains him by habituation, ethismos
until he acquires the right habits (ethos). These habits
are patterns of action acquired by training that uses
pleasure and pain as incentives’’ (Irwin, 1999, p. 324).
One habit that most of us have, albeit to varying
degree, is that of obedience to authority figures.
Parents, teachers, uncles, aunts, and grandparents are
some of the authority figures that we have grown up
obeying, and in organizations, our superiors are the
authority figures we are predisposed to obey. Some-
times we obey them even when we are uncomfort-
able with what they ask us to do. Challenging the
decisions made by superiors thus becomes very dif-
ficult for people who have become habituated to
obeying authority figures. One of the most important
aspects of values and habits is that most of them have
served us in good stead in the past. In this sense, they
facilitate decision making as much as they constrain it.
We generally do not conserve values and habits that
have been consistently detrimental to our well-being.
In this respect, we can think of them as behaviors that
have been selected out of a broader range of behaviors,
and retained for their contributions to our well-being.
At the level of the organization, the inertia gen-
erating entities are routines. According to Nelson
and Winter (1982) they are persistent features of an
organization, and include any characteristics that can
range from well specified technical routines for
production; procedures for hiring and firing;
ordering new inventory; increasing production of
items in high demand; policies regarding investment,
R+D, advertisement; and strategies about product
diversification and overseas investment (p. 14).
Nelson and Winter (1982) take pains to point out
that their emphasis on routines does not preclude
non-routine behavior in firms.
High-level business executives do not, in the modern
world, spend humdrum days at the office applying the
same solutions to the same problems that they were
dealing with five years before. We do not intend to
imply any denial of these propositions in building our
theory of business behavior on the notion of routine.
For the purposes of economic theorizing, the key
point is somewhat different. It is that most of what is
regular and predictable about business behavior is plau-
sibly subsumed under the heading ‘‘routine,’’ espe-
cially if we understand that term to include the
relatively constant dispositions and strategic heuristics
that shape the approach of a firm to the non-routine
problems it faces (p. 15).
Cohendet and Llerena (1998) outline several key
aspects of organizational routines. First, they
encompass the organization’s knowledge basis and
constitute the organizational memory. Second, they
are based on interpretations of the past rather than
on anticipations of the future. Third, they serve a
strong cohesive function, in that they continue long
after the individuals who created them have left the
organization; in this way, they confer on the orga-
nization an identity that is distinct from that of the
individuals within it. Fourth, they allow for the
predictability of individual behavior that is so critical
for collective action. Finally, they are typically hard
to change, and thus lead to inflexibility and inertia in
the organization (after taking account of variation in
their performative aspect – Feldman and Pentland,
2003). Cohendet and Llerena (1998) add that orga-
nizations change routines through trial and error
experimentation and search.
Finally, at the level of institutions, customs and
conventions contribute inertia. Institutions have
been defined in many different ways. Firms, gov-
ernments, and the law (such as contract law) have
been referred to as the institutions that support (or
should support) the functioning of markets. Broader
definitions of institutions have included norms and
conventions. Nelson and Sampat (2001) refer to
institutions as ‘‘patterned human interaction’’ (p. 40)
or ‘‘social technologies’’. An important facet of
economic institutions is that they guide behaviors
and reduce the costs of transacting business (North,
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1990, 2005). Organizations need to know what the
institutional practices are in order to be able to
operate efficiently. For example, an American firm
setting up a subsidiary in Italy must first understand
the norms and conventions of how the relationship
with the tax authorities is to be managed (Kelley,
1977). Institutional frameworks differ in different
countries, and even in different parts of the same
country. Institutions develop over time, through
trial and error, and most researchers emphasize that
we still do not fully understand how institutions
might be deliberately changed or engineered (North,
2005). Whatever the processes are through which
norms and conventions become institutionalized,
most researchers seem to agree that they are
extremely difficult to change in the short term.
Multi-level and multi-stage selection
Multi-level selection (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006;
Durand, 2006; Gould, 2002) is the notion that there
are selection processes operating simultaneously at
different levels – for example, at the individual,
organizational, and institutional levels. The selection
criteria at the three levels can be different, even
contradictory. A team sport like soccer is a good
example to illustrate this point. Who makes it to a
soccer team? Usually it is skilled ball players, with
good physical endurance and above average running
speeds. What accounts for the success of a team? It is
not so much the individual talent that the team is
made up of, but the extent to which the individuals
complement each other and work together in
cohesion. Individual talent is not a sufficient crite-
rion for team success, and too many highly talented
players may even affect the team performance neg-
atively. There have been many instances of teams
with very small budgets that have won champion-
ships by emphasizing team spirit while other more
star-studded teams have not been successful.4 Simi-
larly, free-riding may improve fitness in the short
term at the individual or organizational levels, but
will have deleterious effects at the economic level.
For evolutionary business ethics, multi-level
selection is important because it brings to the fore the
often conflicting interactions of individuals, organi-
zations, and institutions. For example, managers can
benefit by expropriating the resources of the firms in
which they work, but this affects negatively the
prospects of their organizations to be competitive in
the future. Multi-level selection also emphasizes the
nested hierarchy of levels (Burgelman, 1983; Van de
Ven and Grazman, 1999): individuals are nested
within firms, firms within industries, and industries
within economic systems. Viewing an economic
system as a nested hierarchy highlights important
features about how we view change. At lower levels
in the hierarchy, populations are typically larger: for
example, there are more individuals than firms, more
firms than industries, and more industries than eco-
nomic systems. Consequently, at lower levels more
variation is introduced into the system, by virtue of
the fact that the populations are larger. Furthermore,
the lower in the hierarchy, typically the smaller is the
magnitude of each variation – individuals introduce
smaller variations than firms, and firms introduce
smaller variations than are introduced when institu-
tions are redesigned. Higher levels tend to partially
structure selection at lower levels. Thus the ability of
an individual unit at one level to bring about change
at the next higher level is very small, and the noisier
the selection regime is, the more the success or failure
of these efforts rests on factors outside that unit’s
control, i.e. luck.
Multi-stage evolution (Eckhardt et al., 2001)
refers to the notion that populations are exposed to
successive selection screens, and are winnowed at
each one, such that the populations exposed to later
screens are those that have survived earlier ones The
selection criteria in successive stages can be different,
and even contradictory. This makes less valid blanket
statements about what firms should do, because what
they should do might depend upon what stage of
selection they are at. Thus, Eckhardt et al. (2001)
propose that researchers studying the phenomenon
of external financing for start-up firms should not
make the mistake of studying only the firms that
apply for external financing, because there may be
firms with the ‘‘right’’ characteristics as defined by
external investors, whose founders have decided not
to apply for external financing. Friedman’s assertion
that ‘‘the social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits’’ (1970) would, from an evolu-
tionary perspective, beg the question – ‘‘Business at
which stage?’’ It is not clear that the social respon-
sibility of businesses at all stages is to increase profits.
Friedman limits his discussion to publicly owned
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corporations and his assertion may apply to such
entities. But what about start-up firms? It may be
more important for them to establish legitimacy
among stakeholders than produce immediate profits.
Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001) have proposed an
interesting descriptive lifecycle model of stakeholder
theory, without invoking the evolutionary view, in
which they claim that different stakeholder constit-
uencies are given priority at different stages of a
firm’s lifecycle. Multi-stage selection would facilitate
the adoption of such viewpoints.
Multi-stage selection is of great importance for
management theory in general, and for business
ethics in particular, because it raises critical questions
about the sample of populations that makes it
through each selection screen (Denrell and Kova´cs,
2008). For instance, it raises questions such as, Are
firms where non-ethical behaviors are perceived
those that have passed earlier selection screens because
of these unethical behaviors? One group of firms for
which this question is relevant is multinational firms
whose domestic economies are highly corrupt.
These firms may not have been able to grow with-
out playing by the ‘‘rules of the game’’ in their home
markets,5 and may have incorporated routines that
are then carried over to international markets, even
those where the business environment is less corrupt.
Thus, the entities that make it through selection
screens are by definition those that were successfully
adapted to compete in past screens, not in future
ones. Given the inertial tendencies we have already
described, even with foresight incorporated, there is
no promise that the selected entities will be appro-
priately adapted for the challenges they face in sub-
sequent screening processes.
Thus, multi-stage selection obliges researchers to
study on the one hand the firm together with its
environment, and on the other the dynamic inter-
actions of the firm and the environment over time.
An evolutionary grounding for moral luck:
implications for evaluating individual
responsibility
There are two views of the ‘‘responsibility’’ of an
individual – the first based on a causal relationship
between an event and the individual; the second
based on the individual’s capacity for self-governance.
The first view is reflected in the definition of the
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary: ‘‘responsible
for somebody/something’’ is ‘‘having the job or duty
of doing something or caring for somebody/some-
thing, so that one may be blamed if something goes
wrong’’. The expression ‘‘being responsible for
something’’ is defined as ‘‘being the cause of some-
thing and so able to be blamed for it’’. For Aristotle
also, the terms cause, reason, and responsible (aitios,
aitia) are very closely related. Irwin (1999) remarks
that:
Aristotle’s four types of explanation include more than
those we commonly call causal explanations. Some-
times, therefore (e.g., 1100a2, 1137b27) ‘reason’ is
appropriate. ‘Cause’ also renders the preposition dia
(‘because of’)…
In legal contexts the adjective aitios often indicates not
only causation but also blameworthiness, and corre-
spondingly the abstract noun aitia indicates both the
cause and also the ground of accusation. Hence
‘responsible’ is sometimes apt (p. 319).
Bowie (1999) proposes a Kantian notion of the
responsibility of an individual that is more in tune with
the second view of capability. It is based on the twin
concepts of autonomy and self-governance. Accord-
ing to Kant, autonomy implies the capability of self-
governance, which in turn implies that the individual
is a responsible being. ‘‘Thus, there is a conceptual link
between being a human being, being an autonomous
being, being capable of self-governance, and being a
responsible being’’ (p. 44). Of course, for morality
to be within our control – as Kant would like to claim
– we have to be autonomous and self-governing;
otherwise our decisions would not clearly be our own.
Indeed, the very fact that morality is taken to be
wholly within our control is what gives it its unique
worth (Michaelson, 2008).
This Kantian line of argument suggests that a
person’s moral standing should stand apart from luck.
Moral luck theorists argue that things are not so
simple. The fact is that when we evaluate moral
standing we do feel justified in judging individuals
inclusive of their good and bad fortunes – i.e. of
the things that were outside their control as well as
the things that were inside their control. This is the
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problem of moral luck. Even though a significant
part of what someone does may be beyond their
control, we continue to evaluate them as moral
objects (Nagal, 1979; Williams, 1979).
It is our argument that key elements of evolu-
tionary theory provide important context for debates
regarding the appropriate evaluation of individual
responsibility in organizations. The evolutionary
perspective leads us to two key conclusions regarding
responsibility. First, evolutionary theory suggests that
we should reexamine the concept of autonomy and
self-governance provided by Kantianism in its proper
evolutionary context. Second, if responsibility is to be
based on a causal relationship between an event and
an individual’s actions or inactions, then an evolu-
tionary perspective suggests that making that link is
more difficult than many ethical theories would have
us believe. We take these issues up in turn.
Conceptions of autonomy and self-governance
In a powerful critique of modern moral theory,
MacDonald (2001) argues that:
[A]n evolutionary perspective forces us to take an
explicitly historical view of our moral standards. Much
of moral theory is weakened by the extent to which it
fails to appreciate the importance of considering moral
agents as historically and socially situated. Moral theory
mistakenly assumes, for the most part, that agents (or
societies) are in a position of radical choice vis-a`-vis
their moral principles, or more generally, their social
arrangements. Attention to social conventions – actual,
existing, working bits of cooperative behavior – is a
way of taking seriously the moral work already done
by cultural evolution (p. 99).
Put in the context of business ethics, MacDonald’s
key argument here is that the evolutionary view
emphasizes how individuals and the organizations
they work for can only be truly understood if they are
viewed as products of historical accumulation. Such
cumulative processes tend to be both strongly inertial
and strongly path dependent, which means that they
are sensitive to initial (often random) conditions and
the accumulation of contingencies that later become
stubborn facts (North, 1990). Thus, individual char-
acter and organizational worlds evolve, and key as-
pects of this evolution are vulnerable to fortune (good
or bad). As Michaelson (2008) reminds us, while our
character might be ultimately within our control,
local factors such as our upbringing greatly influence
who we become: thus bound, we are not – as Mac-
Donald remarks – in a position of radical choice
regarding the content of our characters and the values
we have been habituated into.
Moral luck theorists describe this as constitutive
luck, arguing that as well as our genes, care givers,
teachers, peers, and other environmental influences
all contribute to making us who we are. Indeed,
there is a long history in Aristotelian philosophy that
recognizes the contingency of individual character
(Nussbaum, 1986; Williams, 1985), i.e. that it is
easier to cultivate certain virtuous characteristics
when circumstances ‘‘break in our favor’’ than when
they do not (Michaelson, 2008).
Similar arguments also extend to organizations. As
with individuals, the constitution of organizations is
in large measure contingent, and certainly not
beyond the influence of luck, happenstance, and
serendipity. So here again this constitution is ren-
dered more easily understood when we look at it
through an evolutionary lens. The values that
become routinely espoused in an organization are a
product of both the moral initiatives managers argue
for (or against) and the organizational screening
mechanisms (structures, processes, culture) that filter
them. These mechanisms are themselves evolved
products of organizational history, in which certain
contingencies are conspicuously influential. One is
founding entrepreneurs, who shape the basic foot-
print of an organization in its early years. Some
organizations (e.g. Merck, Johnson and Johnson,
etc.) have the good fortune of being founded by
individuals with deeply held values that imprinted
their ventures with screening mechanisms that facil-
itate corporate social responsibility (Stinchcombe,
1965). As the recent spate of corporate scandals
perhaps indicates, not all organizations are so lucky.
For other organizations, it is crises that imprint them
in important ways – crises that can unravel in the
most unpredictable fashions. Such episodes shape the
internal organizational fabric, thus influencing which
managerial behaviors get screened in and out. Again,
a good example in this regard is Royal Dutch Shell,
whose contemporary corporate character has been
considerably shaped by the twin crises of the Brent
Spar and Nigerian protest movements, events which
Evolutionary Processes, Moral Luck, and the Ethical Responsibilities of the Manager 121
were carried far outside Shell’s control. It would be
difficult, if not impossible, to understand Shell’s
current corporate practices without regard to the
ways in which these recent episodes in its history
have influenced the organization’s procedures,
routines and conventions. From an evolutionary
perspective, changes in the external selection envi-
ronment (the advance of more critical and salient
stakeholders) have led to changes in Shell’s internal
environment, thus its screening processes. Manage-
rial initiatives that would once have been screened
out at Shell now routinely find support. The example
of Shell therefore highlights several parts of the
general argument we advance in this paper, in that it
shows the importance of:
1. hierarchical selection mechanisms, with the
broader external environment selecting for
different routines inside firms like Shell (that
in turn act as selection mechanisms); and
2. the stickiness of evolved mechanisms, which
demonstrably resist easy change.
Thus, a full consideration of evolutionary theory
encourages us to rethink the concept of autonomy that
Kant uses to attribute responsibility to the individual. It
suggests that we must use a more flexible conception of
autonomy, one that recognizes that the role of forces
that shape an individual’s character are only partially
within an individual’s control. No individual or
organization stands outside the path of their own
evolutionary development, and so every character is
vulnerable to the influence of contingencies and
circumstances beyond their control that nonetheless
shape who they are as a moral entity. Neither organi-
zations nor the managers within them are completely
free to choose their moral principles, and it would be a
mistake to hold them accountable as if they were able
to make such choices unencumbered by a mass of
historical detail. Fundamentally, many aspects of
the constitution of our character are not completely
independent of the world we live and act in.
Responsibility for consequences: evolutionary processes
and resultant luck
A second implication of evolutionary theory for the
responsibilities of managers concerns the results of
moral actions. For, if responsibility is to be based on
a causal relationship between an event and an indi-
vidual’s actions or inactions, then evolutionary the-
ory suggests that making that link is more difficult
than other ethical theories would have us believe.
Moral luck theorists frame this as a problem of
resultant luck. What we suggest here is that the
concept of resultant luck makes more sense when
considered within an explicitly evolutionary frame-
work of thinking.
According to Nelkin (2004), resultant luck is
simply ‘‘luck in the way things turn out.’’ A classic
example of this is two drivers who fail to check
whether their brakes are properly maintained on
their cars: this results in one driver injuring a
pedestrian, but the other does not. We commonly
make different moral assessments of the two drivers,
because things turned out differently for them. This
is a case of resultant luck. A much discussed example
in the organizations and ethics literatures is the
Challenger space shuttle disaster. Investigations into
the cause of the disaster revealed that the shuttle’s
O-rings, which connect segments of the solid rocket
booster, had malfunctioned during and after the
launch. The solid rocket booster was supplied by
Morton Thiokol, one of NASA’s contractors. Roger
Boisjoly, an engineer working at Morton Thiokol
at the time of the disaster, had been seeking to
improve the seals of the O-rings since 1985, and had
repeatedly informed the senior management of his
company of the poor performance of the seals at
temperatures below 75 Fahrenheit (the temperature
at the time of the launch was around 30 Fahren-
heit). He was frustrated when both the senior
management of his company and the client (NASA)
did not seem to comprehend the gravity of the sit-
uation and did not take the required action even
after his repeated warnings. Of course, the space
shuttle had been launched many times without
exposing the faulty O ring problem, even though
the faulty O-rings existed in prior launches also –
perhaps owing to moral luck. But in the Challenger
episode the results were not so kind to NASA and its
astronauts, all seven of whom lost their lives on the
doomed spacecraft.
Of course, from an evolutionary perspective, the
notion of luck has to be made coherent with the
fundamental claim that there are no uncaused causes,
i.e. that every event can be traced to a cause
(Hodgson, 2002, p. 274). If this is the case, then
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every event is determined by scientific laws and by
something else, rather than luck per se. Thus, what
we conveniently ascribe to luck can actually be
examined as being determined by some stochastic
process that perhaps is not visible to us, but none-
theless is, in principle, discernable. Evolutionists feel
obliged to search for causal explanations, albeit with
stochastic drivers – hence luck is the ‘‘luck of the
draw’’ where the draw in question is some particular
aspect in the lottery of life (Borges, 1962).
Nonetheless, there are good reasons why we
might suppose that the ‘‘draws’’ in question are
subject to significant stochastic processes in (com-
plex) socio-economic systems.
First, following from the Challenger example,
socio-economic systems constantly interact with
engineered systems and natural systems, both of which
are often incredibly complex and thus subject to non-
linear properties. It often makes good sense to view
these systems as stochastically determined. Yet, the
behavior of these systems deals out implications for
socio-economic systems, i.e. NASA and its managers.
Second, within socio-economic systems, selection
processes are variable rather than having fixed prop-
erties. Most humanly devised selection screens are
noisy, imperfect, imprecise, and of limited fidelity.
What gets through these screens and eventually ren-
ders consequences varies greatly. For example, work
by March and colleagues (Cohen et al., 1972) illus-
trated that organizational decisions may sometimes be
modeled as garbage can processes. Ethical decision
makers frequently have to contend with the impact of
such unpredictable decision processes on their actions.
Third, selection criteria are different at different
stages and levels, i.e. multi-stage and multi-level
selection processes add considerable uncertainty to
the eventual outcomes of systems. Again, if we take
ethical choices as a unit of analysis, what appears to be
a good choice in a lower level committee process may
not be evaluated as a good choice at a higher or later
committee stage. Shell’s lower-level decision-making
that led to its plan to sink the Brent Spar is a case in
point. Shell got unlucky because some long time after
its engineers chose their strategy, a small group of
Greenpeace activists came up with an ad hoc strategy
to counter Shell (hatched, somewhat unpredictably,
in a Hamburg bar). In the internal struggle that ensued
within Greenpeace, the Hamburgers eventually won
out – their strategy was selected. This somewhat
unpredictable sequence of events subsequently led
Shell to become one of the unluckiest of oil compa-
nies. Yet, how the Shell and Greenpeace decisions
filtered through their respective organizations and
combined to create the Brent Spar incident was
clearly very hard to predict.
For these reasons an evolutionary perspective of-
fers considerable support for moral luck theorists’
arguments that there is a certain irreducible element
of luck that enters into causal chains. In complex open
systems, causal chains are best thought of as partially
understood, and as being influenced by stochastic
properties that insert important gaps (the chance
element) into the relationship between an individual’s
actions (or inactions) and subsequent events. In such
systems, elements of moral luck often enter into final
outcomes, making it much harder in principle to
support consequentialist arguments for individual
responsibility that are based on chains of events.
We recognize, of course, that both constitutive
and resultant luck are deeply troubling for those who
wish to evaluate the ethical performance of manag-
ers, since it suggests that they are less accountable for
their behavior than many moral theorists would like
to believe (Michaelson, 2008). However, moral luck
theorists have argued that there is no way to logically
eliminate the fact that we are more vulnerable to
moral (mis)fortune that we have traditionally sup-
posed, a view that we think is not only consistent
with the key tenets of evolutionary theory, but also
one that an evolutionary perspective lends quite
powerful support to.
Conclusion
This essay has attempted to explore the influence of
evolutionary forces on the moral reasoning process
of managers. This perspective obliges us to take note
of individuals, organizations, and institutions as
products of historical accumulation, and to recog-
nize that moral luck is an inherent product of these
processes. This constrains our ability to make ethical
judgments without accounting for the evolutionary
processes operating at the individual, organizational,
and institutional levels. An evolutionary view does
not imply a deterministic stance on corporate social
responsibility but it does suggest circumspection in
the retrospective moral evaluation of complex
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events. There is a balance of forces influencing
managerial ethics – an exact balance that varies with
time and circumstance. There is room – plenty of
room in our view – for attributing moral responsi-
bility to managers. Individual managers are the
source of all moral initiatives in organizations;
arguments for one action over another always begin
with one or more managers arguing the case for it.6
In our view there is no shortage of moral initiative in
organizations – it is always there, spontaneously
bubbling up. However, we believe that many ethical
analyses leave the reader expecting too much of
flesh-and-blood managers because they fail to paint
an accurate picture of the extent to which moral
decisions are within a manager’s control. Luck and
constraints are ubiquitous. When things go morally
wrong, analysts frequently suppress the role of luck
and constraints in their judgments in favor of
focusing on the insufficiencies of the individuals
involved. We do not want to become apologists for
managers who make unethical choices; those deci-
sions belong to them and always will do so. But we
also believe that zealotry itself is a temptation, must
be appropriately measured, and that it is rather easy
to underestimate how difficult the task is to ensure
an organization behaves ethically. An evolutionary
perspective, we think, helps us towards a better
balance of judgment. It may therefore help us better
comprehend the predicament of managers and the
organizations in which they are situated, and better
still help us design mechanisms that enable them to
choose well when faced with ethical problems.
Thus, an evolutionary view definitely adds com-
plexity (even messiness) to a business ethics analysis.
It suggests origins for what Michaelson (2008)
describes as the two key forces competing in our
moral evaluations, i.e.:
[T]he evident necessity of attributing moral responsi-
bility as if circumstances were within a moral agent’s
control… and the recognition that our lives, including
our moral decisions and even our moral character, are
unavoidably vulnerable to the influence of circum-
stances beyond our control (p. 785).
Linking business ethics into a broader evolution-
ary perspective on how open socio-economic sys-
tems (such as organizations) work enables us to place
the manager in an appropriate setting from which
we can better comprehend why the ethical tension
Michaelson describes incessantly reappears. One
reward for this contextualization might be a greater
appreciation by all concerned for the moral risks
attendant in many business situations.
Notes
1 Schumpeter’s (1950) discourse on the creative
destruction unleashed by entrepreneurial innovation has
been likened to the concept of ‘‘punctuated equilib-
rium’’ in biology. Schumpeter himself explicitly rejected
the biological analogy and defined evolution in more
general terms. Hayek referred to a spontaneous order
emerging out of the actions of atomistic agents acting
on locally contingent information (Hodgson, 1993).
2 There is another implication of accepting multi-level
selection. Social Darwinism, which is discredited at the
individual level, has gained currency at the organizational
level. Publications with laissez faire editorial policies such
as The Economist have repeatedly advocated the with-
drawal of all forms of subsidies from inefficient European
enterprises (both state owned, such as airlines, and pri-
vately owned, such as steel mills) because subsidies would
perpetuate inefficiency in the market, and penalize effi-
cient enterprises. A curious fact is that Herbert Spencer
was a sub-editor at The Economist for five years.
3 This issue is crucial for the business ethics enterprise.
There are strong voices (e.g. Collins and Porras) that
claim that ethical behaviors, rather than the single-
minded pursuit of profit, enhance the future competi-
tiveness and viability of firms. This view contrasts with
the view of many economists (e.g. Friedman, 1970)
who claim that businesses should concern themselves
exclusively with profitability.
4 For example, Real Sociedad and Athletic Club Bil-
bao won the Spanish league several times in the eighties
with local players whom they had groomed from a very
young age, whereas FC Barcelona (with Maradona and
Schuster, among other international stars) and Real
Madrid were not as successful in this period.
5 Whether these firms are perpetrators of corrupt
practices or are themselves victims of the corrupt system
is an issue that is open for debate.
6 Our thanks to an anonymous JBE reviewer for
highlighting this point to us.
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